University of New Haven

Digital Commons @ New Haven
Electrical & Computer Engineering and Computer
Science Faculty Publications

Electrical & Computer Engineering and Computer
Science

5-2014

LiFE (Logical iOS Forensics Examiner): An Open
Source iOS Backup Forensics Examination Tool
Ibrahim Baggili
University of New Haven, ibaggili@newhaven.edu

Shadi Al Awawdeh
University of New Haven

Jason Moore
University of New Haven

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.newhaven.edu/
electricalcomputerengineering-facpubs
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons,
Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security Commons
Publisher Citation
Baggili, I., Al Awawdeh, S., & Moore, J. (2014, May). LiFE (Logical iOS Forensics Examiner): An Open Source iOS backup forensics
examination tool. In Proceedings of the Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law (pp. 41-52).

Comments
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
(c) 2006-2015 Association of Digital Forensics, Security and Law
Dr. Baggili was appointed to the University of New Haven's Elder Family Endowed Chair in 2015.

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2014

LiFE (LOGICAL iOS FORENSICS EXAMINER):
AN OPEN SOURCE iOS BACKUP
FORENSICS EXAMINATION TOOL
Ibrahim Baggili, PhD
ibaggili@newhaven.edu
Shadi Al Awawdeh
shadi77@hotmail.com
Jason Moore
jmoor7@unh.newhaven.edu
ECECS Department, UNHcFREG
Tagliatela College of Engineering
Univesity of New Haven
300 Boston Post Rd,
West Haven, CT 06516
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present LiFE (Logical iOS Forensics Examiner), an open source iOS backup
forensics examination tool. This tool helps both researchers and practitioners alike in both
understanding the backup structures of iOS devices and forensically examining iOS backups. The tool
is currently capable of parsing device information, call history, voice messages, GPS locations,
conversations, notes, images, address books, calendar entries, SMS messages, Aux locations, facebook
data and e-mails. The tool consists of both a manual interface (where the user is able to manually
examine the backup structures) and an automated examination interface (where the tool pulls out
evidence from known files). Additionally, LiFE is designed so that the evidence located in files would
retain its integrity. It is important to note that most of the evidence examined by LiFE is parsed from
SQLite databases that are backed up by iTunes. LiFE also offers an extensibility option to the user,
where an examiner can add new evidence SQLite files to the application that can be automatically
parsed, and these known files are then automatically populated in the automated GUI’s toolbar with an
icon added to the investigator’s liking.
Keywords: iOS forensics, Small Scale Digital Devices, iPhone forensics, iPad forensics, SQLite,
Open source tools, iTunes backup, Extensible forensics software, File identification, LiFE
1. INTRODUCTION
One cannot ignore the importance of forensically examining Small Scale Digital Devices (SSDDs) in
today’s world, especially smart phones. Smart phones have become mini-computers allowing people
to use them very much like a conventional personal computer. The functionality of smartphones has
extended to tablet devices, and tablet-laptop hybrids.
iOS devices have played a major role in shaping our understanding of smart phones (iPhones) and
tablets (iPads) due to their ubiquity amongst users. As iOS usage continues to grow, the probability of
finding critical and relevant digital evidence to a case on iDevices increases as well. Therefore, there is
a strong need to build tools that support both practitioners and researchers alike to examine and
reconstruct digital evidence on iOS devices.
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2. RELATED WORK
2.1 High Level Literature Review
Although there are a number of research projects on iPhone and iPad forensics, the first documented
research was on Apple iPods (Kiley, Shinbara, & Rogers, 2007; Marsico & Rogers, 2005). Since these
initial research projects, the operating systems on iOS devices have significantly changed.
One of the most seminal works on iOS forensics is by Zdziarski (2008). Zdziarski was unique in that
he proposed a method in which the investigators are able to recover deleted data by physically imaging
the iOS device. However, jailbraiking the device was necessary to utilize his method, thereby making
it more difficult to use in investigations as this can cause alterations on the original device
(Barmpatsalou, Damopoulos, Kambourakis, & Katos, 2013).
In 2010, the logical backup copy from iTunes was used to investigate instant messaging on an iPhone
without jailbreaking the device (Husain & Sridhar, 2010; Morrissey, 2010). The manual methodology
used in examining instant messaging artifacts was then explored and expanded in further research on
logical iPhone forensics (Bader & Baggili, 2010; Husain, Baggili, & Sridhar, 2011). At a high level,
these methodologies focused on parsing iTunes backup files, SQLite databases as well as Plist files.
Using the iTunes backup utility was later determined to be the prevailing method for logical
acquisition from an iOS device (Tso, Wang, Huang, & Wang, 2012).
The proposed iOS forensic methodologies have since then been used by researchers to examine social
networking evidence on mobile devices (Jung, Jeong, Byun, & Lee, 2011; Mutawa, Baggili, &
Marrington, 2012) and have been tested on iPads and compared to logical examinations using
automated tools (Ali, Alzarooni, & Baggili, 2012).
Since then, a number of forensic vendors have integrated these methodologies into their products, and
these various methods have been compared and discussed in the literature (Hoog & Strzempka, 2011;
Höne & Creutzburg, 2011).
2.2 iOS Backup Folder Analysis
iPhone backups are stored in different locations based on the computer operating system as shown in
Table 1 (Bader & Baggili, 2010; Carpene, 2011).
Table 1 iPhone Backup Folder Location
OS

Backup path

Win XP

C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\AppleComputer\
MobileSync\Backup

Win 7

\Documents and Settings\( username)\ ApplicationData\ Apple
Computer\MobileSync\ Backup

Mac OSX

~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup.

By using iTunes version 10 or above, files created in the backup folder are of two types: Plist files,
and files without extensions. The main Plist files are (a) Info.plist: This file contains the main
information about the iDevice, such as name, model, firmware version, and identifiers (b)
Manifest.plist: This contains a list on applications from the iDevice and (c) Status.plist: This contains
information related to the device’s backup history (Bader & Baggili, 2010; Carpene, 2011).
The other kinds of files are files without extensions. The name of each file consists of 40 characters. It
is difficult to decide the contents of these files without investigation, but based on the literature and
our testing, the backup predominantly includes images, videos, voice recordings and SQLite database
files.
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Bader and Baggili (2010) explained that when the user creates a backup for the iPhone using iTunes it
will create a folder with a name of 40 hexadecimal characters long that represents the unique device
ID (UDID), and will copy the device contents to the newly created folder. It was also observed that
iTunes can also create a differential backup with a folder name [UDID] + ‘-’ + [Time stamp] in the
same backup location.
iTunes makes a copy of almost all the data stored on the device such as contacts, SMS and MMS
messages, configuration files, database files, keychain, photos, calendar, music, call logs, network
settings, offline web application cache, safari bookmarks, cookies and application data (Bader &
Baggili, 2010). Each file has a unique hash value. Some of the most evidence rich files are shown in
Table 2. It is important to note that these are SHA-1 hashes of the domain and full path on the iDevice.
3. RESEARCH PROBLEM
The methodologies proposed in the literature for the manual forensics logical examination of the
iTunes backup has proven to be useful for both researchers and practitioners alike. However, literature
has shown that more evidence can be extracted using the manual examination approach when
compared to the commercial tools (Ali et al., 2012). This is due to how the backup structures keep
changing from one version of the Apple iOS to the next. Also, most commercial tools only identify
digital evidence such as photos, videos, SMS messages and contacts–even though a lot more evidence
could be present in the backup files.
A novel tool is needed that allows investigators and researchers to manually examine and identify
relevant backup files with potential digital evidence, as well as easily integrate these files into an
automated forensic tool. Extensibility is critical to ensure that newly discovered files are easily
integrated into the tool’s automated Graphical User Interface (GUI).
4. CONTRIBUTION
This research has three major contributions to both the scientific community and practitioners.
Primarily, we provide a customizable open source forensics tool (LiFE) that parses the iOS back up
files. Second, the tool allows for the quick analysis of the backups using two major interfaces: (1) An
interface that helps in the manual examination and discovery of files that could hold potential
evidence; and (2) An interface that allows for the automated parsing of the backup structure. Third,
our approach allows the user to easily update the automated interface–allowing the tool to be
extensible.
5. METHODOLOGY
This research uses a constructive research methodology. A constructive methodology aims at
producing novel solutions to practical and theoretical problems and is widely used by software
engineers (Casper, Soininen, & Vanhanen, 2001). In this research, the following phases were used as
discussed by Casper et al. (2001):
1. Find a practically relevant problem
2. Obtain understanding of the topic and problem
3. Innovate: construct a solution or idea
4. Demonstrate that the solution works
5. Examine the scope of applicability
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Table 2 Popular Backup Files and Their Hash Names
SHA1 value of the DomainName-FilePath
SMS database
3d0d7e5fb2ce288813306e4d4636395e047a3d28
HomeDomain-Library/SMS/sms.db
/private/var/mobile/Library/SMS/sms.db
Call History database
ff1324e6b949111b2fb449ecddb50c89c3699a78
HomeDomain-Library/CallHistory/call_history.db
/private/var/wireless/Library/CallHistory/call_history.db
Safari Bookmarks
d1f062e2da26192a6625d968274bfda8d07821e4
HomeDomain-Library/Safari/Bookmarks.db
/private/var/mobile/Library/Safari/Bookmarks.db
Address Book
31bb7ba8914766d4ba40d6dfb6113c8b614be442
HomeDomain-Library/AddressBook/AddressBook.sqlitedb
/private/var/root/Library/AddressBook/AddressBook.sqlitedb
Notes
ca3bc056d4da0bbf88b5fb3be254f3b7147e639c
HomeDomain-Library/Notes/notes.sqlite
/private/var/mobile/Library/Notes/notes.sqlite
Photos
12b144c0bd44f2b3dffd9186d3f9c05b917cee25
/private/var/mobile/Media/PhotoData/Photos.sqlite
iTunes Store
9143d986a77ab8cf5878e4e9ac80627477eb6674
HomeDomain-Library/com.Apple.itunesstored/itunesstored2.sqlitedb
/private/var/mobile/Library/com.Apple.itunesstored/itunesstored2.sqlitedb
Voice Mail
992df473bbb9e132f4b3b6e4d33f72171e97bc7a
HomeDomain-Library/Voicemail/voicemail.db
/private/var/mobile/Library/Voicemail/voicemail.db
Calendar
2041457d5fe04d39d0ab481178355df6781e6858
HomeDomain-Library/Calendar/Calendar.sqlitedb
/private/var/mobile/Library/Calendar/Calendar.sqlitedb
Email Account (Plist)
5fd03a33c2a31106503589573045150c740721dd
HomeDomain-Library/Preferences/com.Apple.accountsettings.plist
/private/var/mobile/Library/Preferences/com.Apple.accountsettings.plist
Safari History (Plist)
1d6740792a2b845f4c1e6220c43906d7f0afe8ab
HomeDomain-Library/Safari/History.plist
/private/var/mobile/Library/Safari/History.plist
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6. LiFE
The backup structures were documented by the researchers after a comprehensive literature
examination was conducted on the iOS backup structure from iTunes. The literature pointed out that
some of the files residing in the backup folder are SQLite databases, while others are .Plist files and
images. Once the file structures were understood, the tool (LiFE) was built.
LiFE was designed to extract evidence from iOS devices with iOS 6.0.1 backups, because the earlier
iOS versions output different backup structures. To build the tool, we used C# .NET 2010 as a
development platform.
The tool itself is available for use and can be found at http://www.unhcfreg.com <Datasets & Tools>.
6.1. Manual User Interface
To allow the researchers to better understand the backup structures, as well as to improve the
efficiency of the manual examination process described in the literature, a manual user interface was
created as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 LiFE Manual Examination GUI

In the manual examination interface, the user can search for string data throughout all of the files.
Additionally, files are identified based on their header information and connectivity (if the file is a
SQLite database). If a file is a database, its contents are rendered in a grid view displayed on the right
hand of Figure 1, and all its available tables are populated in the Dropdown Box above it.
6.2 Automated user interface
This part of the GUI consists of multiple Document Interface forms (MDI) as well as child forms for
the different modules. Figure 2 shows the interface that automatically extracts evidence from the
backup folder. One can easily examine the evidence of interest by clicking on the respective icon on
the menu bar.
LiFE was divided into modules. Currently, the prototype GUI consists of the following menu items:
1. Device Information
2. Call History
3. Voice Messages
4. GPS Locations
5. Conversations
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6. Notes
7. Images
8. Address Book
9. Calendar
10.SMS
11.Locations
12.Aux Locations
13.Facebook
14.Emails
It is critical to note that these menu items are optional. The user has the full authority to change the
menu names, icons, and orders as preferred. In the prototype we created some fixed menu items that
are necessary for the function of the tool.

Figure 2 Automated LiFE MDI Window

6.3 Ensuring the Integrity of the Backup Files
LiFE was designed in a manner that protects the integrity of the digital evidence. Protecting the
integrity of the evidence is critical to ensure its admissibility (Wayne & Ayers, 2007). When the code
was written, no methods that wrote to the backup folder or modified the files were utilized, only
methods and functions that read the backup files and searched within the files were used.
Once the backup folder is selected for analysis, all the files are hashed and the pre-analysis values are
stored in a SQLite database file. Once the user closes the application, the application will compute the
hash values of all the files post-analysis, and compare them to the pre-analysis hash values. An
integrity report is then presented to the user.
To ensure the accuracy of our implemented hashing function, we purposefully modified some files
after the pre-analysis hashing and observed that our hashing function detected the changes in the
modified files.
6.4 File Identification
We used different methods to identify files in the manual and automated GUIs to identify both SQLite
and Plist files.
To identify the SQLite database files we used two techniques. The first was to search the files for the
SQLite file signature. In this method we used the file stream command File.ReadAllText() to read the
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contents of every file as a text file, we then searched the returned text file for the signature “SQLite
format 3” by simply searching the first two lines in each file in the backup folder.
The second method used was to loop through all of the files while trying to perform a database
connection to each file. By default, SQLite database files will succeed in creating the connection while
other non-SQLite files will return error messages. We observed that this method is slower than the
signature based searching method, however, it can be used to validate the files after the signature is
found.
In order to connect to SQLite database file we needed a database engine. We first used a DLL library
called SQLite.NET and referenced it by typing “using Finisar.SQLite.” This DLL was not able to
establish connectivity to all the database files. The solution was to upgrade to the latest version of
SQLite which supported WAL (Write Ahead Logging). The latest version of the SQLite DLL was
downloaded from http://system.data.sqlite.org and referenced by typing “using System.Data.SQLite.”
This helped ensure the tools compatibility in connecting to various types and versions of SQLite
databases.
We also used the keyword or signature searching method to identify the Plist files in the iOS backup
folder. We used the Plist file-signature matching technique and searched all of the backup file headers
for the Plist file signature “bplist00Ø.”
Some of the visible Plist files in the backup folder are Status.plist, Manifest.plist and Info.plist. These
files were clearly identified because they have the file extension .Plist, but only the file signature could
identify the other Plist files as they did not have an extension. We were able to read the first level of
tags in Info.plist, but we could not properly read the other Plist files. The Plist parser in our tool
requires more coding and enhancement to translate the Plist files to a readable format.
An important aspect of the iOS backup are the images. Two techniques were used to identify image
files. In the first technique we applied a file signature searching technique searching for the existence
of the “Exif” file signature. We also searched the files for known image file formats: gif, png, jpg,
jpeg, bmp and ico.
In the other technique, we attempted to validate the image files by looping through all of the files in
the backup folder, reading them in as binary files, then loading them one by one into a PictureBox
control. The valid images were loaded successfully into the PictureBox, while the non-valid image
files generated error messages. We then displayed all of the valid images in a photo album as shown in
Figure 3.

Figure 3 Images Identified in the PhotoAlbum
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At this point, we were able to identify and display the SQLite database files, image files and partially
view some of the Plist file contents.
We successfully connected to the following databases: Call History, Voice Messages, GPS Locations,
Conversations, Notes, Images, Address Book, Calendar, SMS, Locations, Aux Locations, Facebook
friends, and we successfully retrieved all the valid email combinations in the backup files using
regular expressions.
6.5 Retrieving Data from the Databases
For each database, we select one table to be the initially selected table for binding to the
DataGridView control. For example, once the call history tab is clicked the grid is populated with the
data from the table named “call” using this SQL statement “Select rowid, address, datetime(date
,'unixepoch') as MyDate, duration from call". The other tables in the selected database are populated in
the DropDown list where the user can select any table to view its contents. Figure 4 shows the call
history list populated from the call table.

Figure 4 Call History List, From the Call Table

The Unix-epoch modifier in the previously mentioned SQL select statement expects a value in seconds
and it is used to convert the Unix time format into a readable human format. For example, select
datetime ('1289325613', 'unixepoch') returns the value 2010-11-09 18:00:13 if executed in SQLite
Maestro.
Maps and location tracking is one of the new features in smart phones allowing users to view maps,
select locations, etc. One of the tables called AuxPhoto, exists in the database with the hashed name
“1CCF21CD386D7925EB1F6DB5B53AB60890F27CB7,” and contains longitude and latitude
columns. We allow the user to navigate to the real location of that longitude and latitude and preview a
map using the Google maps website by embedding it into a webBrowser control in our tool. Figure 5
shows the values of the AuxPhoto table.
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Figure 5 AuxPhoto Table Contents

For the longitudes and latitudes shown in Figure 5 we included a ShowMap column in the results of
the AuxPhoto table to allow the user to view the map for a certain latitude and longitude. When
clicking on the ShowMap corresponding to a specific longitude and latitude, we pass the values to
google maps and display the map result in our tool as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6 A Map Retrieved by LiFE

6.6 LiFE Extensibility
To make LiFE more extensible and dynamic, and to minimize the amount of required coding for the
Automated GUI, we created a database table for the known SQLite database files. In that table we
added a readable name for the database, as well as its hashed name and the name of an icon file that
reflects the database contents. If these items are properly added to this table, these new items are
dynamically populated in the toolbar and the required evidence is populated from the configured
database once the program is started. This extensible database table is shown in Figure 7, and its
respective data entry form is shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 7 Toolbar Icons and Related File Names

Figure 8 Toolbar Icon Details Entry Form

7. FUTURE WORK
In the future the authors hope to find better mechanisms for parsing Plist files located in the iTunes
backup. Additionally, the authors are currently working on developing a triage screen that could be
integrated into LiFE so that investigators can quickly and reliably understand the contents of the iOS
device, aiding in profiling the device and its user.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have taken a manual iOS backup forensics methodology and have integrated that
methodology into a tool called LiFE. We illustrated the vast amount of evidence that could be
retrieved from an iOS logical backup that could potentially be relevant to an investigation. LiFE can
potentially speed up research and investigations related to iOS backup forensics.
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